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Abstract 
 
Can the United States transform itself into a green state? This chapter examines the 
institutional and ideological barriers preventing the transition to low carbon, sustainable 
polity. Drawing on institutionalist and discourse frameworks, it shows how institutional 
barriers are today further entrenched by powerful discursive frames that favor anti-state, 
anti-climate advocates. The chapter then examines how such institutional, ideational and 
discourse barriers might be overcome to encourage a green state transformation. It argues 
that any such transformation must come from ‘below’ the state, and must involve a 
change not just in government policy and practice, but in discourse and citizen 
engagement. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade questions about the nature of the state and whether it can address 
contemporary global environmental challenges – especially those of sustainability and 
climate change - have preoccupied theoretical and practical debates. Some International 
Relations scholars suggest globalization has rendered the state impotent and that other 
actors – multinational corporations, NGOs, international organizations, have become 
more important in determining whether and how such issues will be addressed (Held and 
McGrew 2002; see also Lövbrand and Linnér this volume). Meanwhile many greens 
deeply distrust the state and the centralization and authoritarianism it implies (Torgerson 
2005); some, especially those drawn towards eco-anarchism, would even advocate its 
abolition (Bookchin 1991). Other theorists, however (Eckersley 2004; Paehlke and 
Torgerson 2005; Connelly et al. 2012), have argued compellingly that the state is here to 
stay and that there is much promise in the idea of reforming (or transforming) the state so 
that it can respond to environmental challenges (see also Bäckstrand and Kronsell this 
volume). These green state scholars suggest the possibility of developing genuinely 
ecologically sensitive states that can fulfill the role of a “public ecological trustee” 
(Eckersley 2004, 12) and coax their polity toward addressing domestic and global 
environmental challenges. This chapter examines the prospects of and barriers to such a 
transformation in the United States.  
 
The green state 
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A green state is one capable of developing policies and practices designed to limit 
harmful emissions and achieve a sustainable future for its citizens. Such a state would 
assume responsibility for environmental harm domestically but also seek to develop 
ecologically responsible statehood globally (In this chapter particular attention is paid to 
the state’s ability to address climate change.). In her seminal work, Eckersley (2004) 
identified some key challenges to greening the state (including the dominance of 
sovereignty, capital accumulation and democracy deficit), but also countervailing 
positive trends (multilateral agreements, rise of ecological modernization, and 
deliberative democratic practices). Complementing Eckersley’s work, other writers have 
investigated these challenges and opportunities in more depth (Hysing this volume). 
Ecological modernizationscholars have demonstrated how states can ‘green’ by 
developing economic strategies linked to reform of the market economy and production 
processes (Mol 1996; Hajer 1995). Dryzek et al.’s comparative study (2003) identifies the 
state and societal features more amendable to greening strategies.  They find that 
greening the state is more likely when environmental strategies are linked to state 
imperatives such as security or economic growth. Paehlke (2005), Smith (2005), 
Meadowcroft (2004 and Eckersley (2004) focus particularly on the role of deliberative 
democracy in pushing a state forward.  
 
Despite different arguments and emphases within green state literature there is a 
consensus that the contemporary US lags well behind others in the development of green 
statehood. This chapter shares that view: the US has not achieved the domestic or global 
role outlined above and is not close to green statehood as defined above. The main 
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concern of the chapter is to explain that laggard development as well as exploring how a 
transformation may be achieved. Most explanations for America’s laggardness focus on 
either institutional (constitutional separation of powers; multiple veto points) or 
ideological barriers (neoliberalism or individualism) to greening the state. This chapter 
demonstrates that both institutions and ideology are important, but suggests they gain full 
potency only when embedded in public discourse. How the state and the challenges of 
climate and sustainability are understood by policymakers and the public are crucial to 
understanding the limits of the US as green state, as well as the possibilities of a 
transformation.  
  
To examine these barriers and their interaction, this chapter adopts a hybrid framework 
combining an emphasis on institutions, ideology and discourse. It uses those insights to 
identify the institutional and ideological barriers stymieing progress towards green 
statehood. It then examines how each barrier is underlined and enforced by powerful 
frames that currently favor anti-state, anti-climate advocates. The subsequent section 
explores how these institutional, ideational and discourse barriers might be overcome to 
allow a transformation of the state. It considers first arguments that the US central state 
could, by adopting a weak form of ecological modernization, develop into a potential 
‘environmental neoliberal state’ which would focus on promoting national economic 
activity and technological innovation (Christoff 2005; MacNeil and Paterson 2012). The 
chapter counters this claim, arguing instead that any transformation must come from 
below the state level and must involve a change in discourse as much as in policy and 
practice. 
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Framework 
 
This chapter draws first on new institutionalist literature to help identify and analyze the 
institutional factors constraining US state action. Writers in this school suggest 
institutional structures and norms operating in the US constrain policy action in powerful 
ways (Weaver and Rockman 1993; Nivola and Jones 2008). These structures include 
formal institutions (e.g. legislative structures, constitutional and voting rules, federalism) 
as well as informal institutions - behavioral norms such as adversarialism - which shape 
actors’ political behavior. I also draw on other institutionalists who focus more on 
ideology (Checkel 2005), especially the norms and values of neo-liberalism and 
individualism. I then supplement this institutionalist literature with insights from 
discourse analysis, which places greater emphasis on how problems are defined, framed, 
argued and debated.1 Drawing on studies of media and public opinion data, I show how 
attention to discursive frames provides an important supplement for understanding public 
acceptance of state action and transformation. 
 
Institutional Barriers 
 
The institutional barriers to positive US state action are many. Chief amongst formal 
institutional constraints is the federal legislative system, which is “deliberately designed 
to restrain the scale and pace of change” (Nivola and Jones 2008, 13). The constitutional 
separation of powers makes policymaking difficult and gridlock more likely, especially 
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on politically divisive issues such as climate change. Competition between the executive 
and congressional branches of government is built into the US policymaking system, and 
judicial action – either pushing or resisting environmental change – is a further powerful 
dynamic. More generally the US political system is characterized by its multiple veto 
points: actors occupying positions (in different institutions, different branches of 
government and at different levels of governance) can block action at several points in 
the policymaking process. Each point creates an opportunity for some interest or 
constituency to demand a concession or to block progress. In the US, a plethora of 
organized interests can further stagnate change and can render any reform – especially 
the sort required by greening – particularly difficult (Kleiman and Teles 2006, 642; 
Christoff and Eckersley 2011, 440). Entrenched interests are apparent in US climate and 
environmental policy, which is marked by vociferous constituencies on either side of a 
given issue (Bomberg and Schlosberg 2008; Nijhuis 2014).2  
 
In recent years, climate and other environmental legislation has faced additional 
institutional hurdles as adversaries within Congress employ institutional rules to block 
executive action. The use of filibuster – an on-going speech in the Senate intended to 
block legislative action – has increased sharply and has been invoked to block climate 
and environmental legislation. More recently, its use was threatened by Republicans keen 
to block Obama’s appointments to head the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
(Peters 2013). These strong veto players make it more difficult to re-evaluate existing 
policies and even harder to change them. The resulting ‘path dependency’ means that it is 
hard to change strategy or policy, even when it outlives its usefulness, because of 
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entrenched interests but also because of the ‘sunk costs’ (time and resources) already 
invested. It is an especially powerful explanation of current dilemmas of greening, and 
helps explain, for instance, the continuation of subsidies for fossil fuels, or the difficulty 
of developing more sustainable forms of transport (Paterson 2007). 
 
These institutional dynamics have become more apparent in recent environmental and 
climate policy. The promise of transformational change in environmental and climate 
issues under an Obama presidency (Bomberg and Super 2009) soon reverted to 
legislative stagnation as congressional – executive relations soured and blockages 
increased. Although a modest proposal for climate legislation made it through the House 
in 2009 it did not survive the Senate and soon slipped off the federal (both congressional 
and presidential) agenda. The setback sparked dismay from environmentalists who 
complained of presidential broken promises and neglect. But the setback was more a 
product of institutional barriers rather than any personal presidential betrayal.  
 
Accompanying these structural constraints are informal norms such as increasing and 
intensified partisanship, entrenched adversarialism and severe fragmentation. In the US 
the constitutional brakes on policymaking described above are ever present, but they have 
been exacerbated in recent administrations by a fiercely adversarial atmosphere. The 
Obama administration promised to bring to Washington not just stronger environmental 
policy but a new mood of bipartisanship and working across the aisle. Obama stressed 
that US “efforts to create jobs, achieve energy security and combat climate change 
demand integration among different agencies, cooperation between federal, state and 
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local governments and partnership with the private sector” (Obama 2010), but 
cooperation amongst government, private and public actors remained elusive. By some 
measures the level of partisanship in US government today is the highest on record 
(Abramowitz 2013). Aspirational, positive environmentalism is easily sabotaged in this 
adversarial milieu. It means, for instance that the veto points and institutional blocks 
mentioned above are invoked more often and with more vigor. Such adversarialism was 
rife during earlier climate change bill debates3 but also present in more recent debates on 
Keystone XL oil pipeline and, especially, executive attempts to regulate carbon 
emissions. Using its authority under the Clean Air Act, the EPA issued rules in 2014 
compelling new electricity utilities to limit emissions of any new facilities.4 The move 
sparked fierce, immediate opposition from Republican opponents who, insisting the rules 
would decimate coal industry and harm the economy, vowed to thwart further executive 
action. 
 
Ideological Barriers 
 
A closely linked set of explanations for America’s ‘un-green’ state focuses on ideological 
barriers, which exacerbate institutional constraints. The most dominant of these is a 
neoliberal ideology, which favors markets over state action and makes it difficult for 
governments to take a proactive role. Peter Christoff (2005, 304) for example, notes how 
neoliberalism leads states to eschew responsibility for natural resources protection and 
instead shift control and ownership to the private sector. In their comparison of the 
potential of states to achieve green statehood, several authors conclude that EM strategies 
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are easier to pursue in social democratic welfare states (Mol and Spaargaren 2000; Hajer 
1995; Christoff 2005). Similarly the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 
2001) draw useful distinctions between coordinated market economies and liberal market 
economies and suggest that the latter is less likely to develop state-led environmental 
leadership because of a highly antagonistic relationship between markets and state. In his 
explanation of the US’s comparatively laggard pace on climate change, for instance, 
Driesen (2010, 112) underlines a culture of market fundamentalism and an “ideological 
climate that embraced free markets as the solution to all economic and social issues and 
regarded vigorous government action as anathema”. Meanwhile a neoliberal preference 
for “more market, less state” has become especially evident in congressional voting 
patterns in the last decade (MacNeil and Paterson 2012, 236). 
 
Linked to neoliberalism is a strong emphasis on individualism, a distrust of the state, and 
a limited conception of the public good (Bomberg 2003). Foley (2007, 37) outlines 
American’s deep historical emphasis on individualism and distrust. American liberty, he 
writes, acquires its meaning through the agency of the individual rather than social 
classes or nationality: “In American eyes it is a matter of simple logic that a society 
dedicated to liberty should have as its hallmark the freedom of the most fundamental 
constituent unit of that society- the individual citizen”. That logic is reflected in the 
constitutional blueprint that intentionally ring-fences state power with prohibitions and 
constraints. But the belief also underlines public attitudes towards the scope of 
government action, which is often summed up as: “freedom preserved by the state must 
always be qualified by guarantees of freedom from the state” (Foley 2007, 40). Put 
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bluntly, greening initiatives (to reduce harmful emissions, to ensure sustainability) are 
most likely to succeed when they do not invoke the central state. 
 
In sum, institutional constraints and ideology defining US environmental policies and 
politics has led to a seemingly dysfunctional – or at least a severely challenged – green 
state. Its neoliberal ideology and adversarialism, in particular, seem to suggest the US 
would be far less likely to take a green lead compared to other, especially Nordic, welfare 
states characterized by greater cooperation among business, government and 
environmental groups (MacNeil and Paterson 2012, 234; see also others this volume). 
 
Yet these barriers alone do not explain US laggardness. First, the institutional barriers 
outlined above are not unique to the US; analysts of European Union (EU) policy have 
revealed a similarly rich vein of institutional hurdles, contestation and policy convolution 
(see Peterson and Shackleton 2012). Yet the EU has been able to take a significant 
leadership role on climate and sustainability (Bomberg 2009; Schreuers and Tiberghien 
2007).  Secondly, despite long standing entrenched ideologies and barriers, the US has 
showed itself capable of far reaching environmental action, including under Republican 
presidents (Bomberg 2003). Nor must neoliberalism itself be a barrier. Christoff (2005, 
304), for example, refers to Australia as a possible “neoliberal environmental state” 
active in promoting economic growth through environment-related state funding and 
activity.  The hurdles facing the current US, in other words, are neither unique nor new. 
What is distinctive is the extent to which these hurdles are accompanied by an 
increasingly powerful anti-state discourse, which renders pro-active state action 
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extremely difficult. We explore below how actors opposed to state action have 
successfully framed environmental action – and especially climate change – as an 
unimportant problem, and the state’s role on climate as negative, intrusive and even ‘un-
American’. 
 
Discursive Barriers 
 
Discourse analysis focuses on how problems are defined and debated, and how through 
that process an overall narrative (or story) emerges (Hajer 1995).  In the area of climate 
change, opponents to action have sought to construct an overall narrative of climate 
denialism which acts as a discursive barrier to state action on climate. Key to this 
narrative-building is the act of framing which refers to how actors select and emphasize 
particular aspects of an issue according to an overarching shared narrative and set of 
assumptions (Miller 2000, 211). Frames can be used to draw attention to a problem (or 
solution), but also to deflect attention away from an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 2009.5 
In the discourse battle surrounding climate change, one of the most powerful frames 
employed by opponents of climate action is the “doubt frame”. Corporate interests 
threatened by more rigorous climate legislation have long employed such a frame in an 
effort to downplay the link between greenhouse gases and warming temperatures and 
thus call into question the need for state action or regulation. A range of scholars (see 
Christoff and Eckersley 2011; Dunlap and McCright 2011; Jacques 2009; McCright and 
Dunlap 2003) have outlined how corporate funded organizations generate intentionally 
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conflicting or misleading knowledge to underpin the doubt frame, and use the media links 
to limit and mold available information about climate change (Norgaard 2011).  
 
The use of the doubt frame is evident in opponents’ response to the Obama 
Administration’s recent efforts to reduce emissions through EPA regulations. An 
example is provided by the Environmental Policy Alliance (it has intentionally 
appropriated the acronym of the federal Environmental Protection Agency), which was 
created in 2014 by a public relations firm representing large corporate interests opposed 
to legislation on energy or climate. On their website, the Alliance repeats claims of the 
well-known climate-denying Heartland Institute that the International Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) science is “seriously flawed”, the link between emission and changing 
climate is “still unclear” and that alarmists have created a “fictitious global warming 
crisis” (Heartland Institute 2014). 
 
According to discourse analysts, a narrative is successful if it achieves discursive 
dominance in public debate. Such dominance is reflected in public opinion polls and 
media reporting or government pronouncements (Hajer 1995). According to several 
criteria it appears that the climate opponents’ narrative of climate denialism has taken 
hold in the US public debate and consciousness. Opinion polls show significant 
skepticism surrounding the science of climate change. Compared to citizens in most other 
countries Americans show much greater doubt about the existence and severity of climate 
change and its anthropogenic causes. That trend is well documented by Gallup and Pew 
opinion polls, which have tracked the percentage of Americans agreeing that “there is no 
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solid evidence for global warming” (Gallup Organization 2014). Although the percentage 
doubting the existence of climate change has decreased since 2008-9, it still remains over 
a quarter of the population. A much greater percentage continues to deny that humans are 
responsible for that change.6  
 
Media portrayals, too, illustrate a dominant narrative of denialism communicated through 
frames of doubt.7 A recent study analyzing television coverage of both national and 
international climate change reports showed that coverage of climate by major networks 
is low overall (an IPCC report received a total of two minutes on CNN), with an overall 
emphasis on doubt and even superstition. (A Fox News announcer introduced the 
scientific consensus on climate change as “the oldest superstition around” (Media Matters 
2014)). According to other studies, most networks also tend to feature false balance by 
providing equal time and credibility to scientists confirming or denying climate change 
(see also Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). Similarly the doubt frame is reflected in US 
media’s increasing use of hedging words (such as perhaps, speculative, controversial, 
blurry and disagreement) when reporting on climate scientists’ reports. In their 
comparative study of coverage of the 2014 IPCC report, Bailey et al. (2014) note how US 
newspapers increased their utilization of such words even as the scientific consensus that 
climate change is real and humans are contributing to it has substantially strengthened. 
 
Although scholars have given much attention to this sort of climate framing, fewer have 
focused on the framing of the state and how that might shape public understanding of 
climate and environmental policy (but see Antonio and Brulle 2011). In their public 
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discourse many opponents of green or climate action often portray the state as oppressive, 
stifling prosperity and infringing economic and individual liberty. This “oppressive state” 
frame is highly resonant in current debates and illustrated in the Environmental Policy 
Alliance’s full page advert in the Wall Street Journal (3 July 2014) warning that 
“Obama’s EPA…is moving full steam ahead with oppressive energy regulations to make 
higher costs a reality”. Similarly, opponents to climate initiatives in Congress accused the 
administration not just of imposing an economic burden but of executive branch 
“suffocation”, “over-reach” and a President “hell bent on adding layer after layer of 
harmful red tape” Republican Congressman quoted in the Washington Post 15 July 2014.  
 
Although the resonance of the anti-state frame is often overlooked, it can be powerful. 
One telling indicator is the consecutive Gallup polls which gauge over time Americans’ 
view of the state, business and trade unions. Asked in 2013 which will be the biggest 
threat to the country – business, labor or government – an overwhelming 72 % believed 
big government posed the gravest threat. Moreover that percentage has risen significantly 
in the last decade (Gallup Organization 2013). 8 In sum, according to several indicators 
an anti-climate and anti-state narrative currently enjoys discourse dominance in US 
debate. Such dominance suggests a different sort of transition may be needed to green the 
state, one that tackles institutional and ideological barriers, but also re-frames climate, the 
state, and citizens’ relationship to both.  
 
Transformation of the state?  
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The institutional and ideological barriers to a green US state are formidable. Crucially, 
these features gain potency when combined with a narrative eschewing action on climate 
generally, and especially action by the state. But we also know the US system can feature 
dynamism, and the ability to change, innovate and adapt. It has done so in the past on 
issues linked to the environment (Bomberg 2003). Moreover the state, and our 
conceptions of it, can transform and have done so throughout history (Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge 2014). So how might the US state be greened? What are prospects for a 
transition? While the barriers outlined above cannot be entirely removed, several avenues 
for reform are possible and underway. 
 
Empowering the central state 
 
One way to bypass veto points outlined above has already been attempted: it involves the 
executive taking a more active unilateral role in promoting climate care and 
sustainability. As mentioned above, the Obama administration has used enacting 
legislation to pursue carbon reduction objectives through unilateral authority in the form 
of federal greenhouse gas reduction regulations (Kahn 2014). The measure is an example 
of how the administrative state has been able to use powerful direct state intervention to 
reduce harmful pollutants and improve public health. However, this top-down move is 
politically unpopular and subject to considerable pushback. 
 
Likely to be more successful are executive actions re-framed not as climate or carbon 
reduction initiatives but as economic opportunities. Echoing descriptions of Christoff’s 
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environmental neoliberal state (2005), this ecological modernization approach shifts the 
“capital accumulation imperative” from acting as a hurdle (Eckersley 2004) to a key tool 
in shifting to a low carbon society. The shift is in evidence within the Obama 
administration. His earlier global emphasis on the need to protect the environment and 
avoid a “Planet in Peril” (Obama 2009) has shifted to a frame of economic opportunity 
for the nation. Similarly Fletcher (2009) tracks the development of a positive 
“opportunity frame” (the ‘Apollo’ frame) with an emphasis on industrial transformation, 
technological innovation, and economic opportunity.9 MacNeil and Paterson (2012, 241) 
also note Obama Administration’s increasing tendency to present climate initiatives (such 
as renewables) as a technologically savvy, neoliberal economic opportunity.   
 
Similarly, central state action could be further empowered if climate and environmental 
goals were couched in terms of national security. Schlosberg and Rinfret (2008) note how 
re-framing climate as security issue makes clear the links between climate and the need 
for government action.  For the US that security frame would encompass security of lives 
and livelihoods. Such a shift is now more relevant following recent dramatic weather 
events, which proponents of climate action can link to climate change.  This “scary 
weather” frame – invoking a threat to American infrastructure, farm land and lives – is 
very pertinent when conveyed as an immediate economic threat. The third US National 
Climate Assessment (NCA), which was released by the federal government in May 2014, 
outlined the direct consequences for the US economy if no action were taken.  With a 
heavy emphasis on US producers it warned:  
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Climate change, once considered an issue for a distant future, has moved firmly 
into the present. Corn producers in Iowa, oyster growers in Washington State, 
and maple syrup producers in Vermont are all observing climate-related changes 
that are outside of recent experience… (US Global Change Research Program 
2014, 1)  
 
A tandem security frame – that of energy security or independence – held promise in the 
early 2000s. This frame stressed the need to conserve and limit fossil fuel use to avoid 
dependence on dodgy foreign energy sources. But this frame is no longer as resonant 
following the recent boon in shale gas, which has increased remarkably the US access to 
domestic energy. Exploitation of shale gas through hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) is 
not new, but it has experienced an astonishing revival in the US. Despite profound 
environmental concerns fracking operations have increased dramatically, with yields 
jumping from less than 1% percent in the late 1990s, to 20 % of domestic gas production 
by 2010 (EIA 2012). While its contribution to low carbon state remains controversial10 
shale gas has certainly rendered far less powerful the notion that energy conservation and 
climate reduction is the key to ensuring US energy security. Nonetheless, wider national 
security framing remains potentially potent.   
 
For its proponents such re-framing could herald a wider, much more fundamental re-
framing of green issues away from a vaguely altruistic goal to a central organizing 
principle of the state’s domestic and foreign policies.  Some writers have suggested these 
measures herald the emergence of an “American style” ecological modernization 
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(Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). But there are limits to this strategy and its contribution to 
a US green state. First, while the Administration’s focus on unilateral action is 
understandable, Obama’s measures will be subject to challenge (they already are), not 
just by corporate interests but other organs of the state (including Congress and perhaps 
also the Courts). Also, while this strategy involves re-thinking and re-framing climate 
change and its effects, it does not re-think the state. Nor does it involve citizens or change 
their view of the state.  Finally, this re-framed narrative has become strikingly inward 
looking and does not focus on a direct global role for US. Proponents argue that the US 
acting domestically would inevitably address global responsibilities, but this domestic 
focus calls into question the green state requirement of multilateral action and 
engagement (see Eckersley 2004). In short, this path alone will not lead to an American 
green state.  
 
Re-locating the state 
 
Another approach is not to empower the state but to re-locate its locus of power. 
Americans’ view of a/the central state is distrustful, and becoming more so (Micklethwait 
and Wooldridge 2014). But views of their own state (e.g. California, Wisconsin, New 
Hampshire) or local governments tend to be much more charitable (McKay 2013, 66). 
Thus empowering the sub-state and local level is a way to re-shape citizens’ views of 
government and state action. It might, in other words, form part of a slow move to 
rehabilitating the state in the eyes of its citizens and counter opponents’ depiction of state 
action as oppressive and threatening. Moreover, while the federal institutional obstacles 
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outlined above are not absent on the state level, they are more easily overcome. The 
expanding literature on US cities, states and climate suggests how on the subnational 
level climate advocates are creating new initiatives or expanding existing ones (Selin and 
VanDeveer 2009, 309). Barry Rabe (2004; 2010) and others have documented a plethora 
of state-led collaborative initiatives to combat climate, including greenhouse gas (GHG) 
inventories, mandatory caps, and multi-state carbon cap and trade programs. These same 
measures have struggled to gain acceptance on the federal level. Also significant is the 
extent to which these government-led initiatives are (partially) able to circumvent the 
partisanship and adversarialism of the federal level. In contrast to federal level stagnation, 
state government climate initiatives have been generally bipartisan and consensual (Rabe 
2004). Also striking is states’ growing willingness to engage beyond the nation-state to 
forge international networks of climate initiatives and ideas (Selin and van Deveer 2009, 
312; Climate Group 2014; Cashmore and Rozema, this volume). Of course states vary 
significantly in their embrace of green policies and it is easy to overstate the sub-state 
green transformation. While Vermont, California and others have introduced far- 
reaching innovative climate measures, other states remain inactive if not downright 
hostile to climate action.11  
 
Empowering the citizens 
  
Re-locating state power down to a level closer to citizens is also a way to empower 
greater citizen action, whatever their home state. Eckersley’s vision of the green state is 
based on notions of citizen input because “all those potentially affected by ecological 
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risks ought to have some meaningful opportunity to participate, or be represented in the 
determination of politics of decisions that may generate risks” (Eckersley 2004, 243). 
Similarly Dryzek et al.’s comparative study underlined the core role of social movements 
and NGOs. In the American context, citizen action to green the state will be most 
powerful when framed in a distinctly American context. In particular it will be strongest 
when wedded to two powerful trends in US political culture that were first observed by 
de Tocqueville in the 19th century. The first is an appeal to the individual as an agent of 
social dynamism (Foley 2007, 43). But the second American trend is equally important. It 
involves tapping the ethos of communal responsibility through the building of 
community groups and organizations. That appeal would both moderate the effects of the 
individual and create an intermediary organization that would resist the intrusion of “any 
large scale organized force” (i.e. the state) (de Tocqueville in Foley 2007, 45).  
Americans are individualists but they are also joiners.  Both strands can be harnessed for 
climate action (see Paehlke 2005). 
 
In short, an ecological modernization approach - re-framing climate as  
economy-boosting, technology-rich, security-enhancing project aiding America’s current 
and future generations - is an important step in the construction of a green state. But 
equally important is re-framing the state, society and individual as outlined by Christoff 
(1996) in his version of strong ecological modernization. How citizens view the state and 
their own role within it, will be crucial. In practical terms that means action must come 
from below. We have already seen such initiatives in the area of city or local measures on 
climate mitigation (Gore and Robinson 2009). These mitigation initiatives are small scale 
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and most are non-binding, but they allow local actors to shape policy and behavior on 
day-to-day activities and thus can alter citizens’ conceptions of climate and climate 
action.  Such activity resembles what transition theorists refer to as micro niches: 
protected spaces for experimental activity and developments, which can over time, 
challenge or transform dominant practices (Bäckstrand and Kronsell this volume; 
Berkhout et al. 2003). 
 
While such micro mitigation activities are well documented, less attention has been given 
to climate adaptation initiatives, perhaps because adaptation measures do not combat 
climate change and thus are not immediately seen as part of greening or low carbon 
transition. Yet adaption projects can play an important role in re-framing how citizens 
view climate and the state. Crucially, recent activity in the area of climate adaptation has 
involved federal authorities, but not in a visible role. Federal authorities have worked 
with local governments and groups, providing funding and expertise for adaption 
projects.  Because that federal action is low profile it tends to sidestep high profile 
political battles. As one observer noted, “the idea is to get this conversation on climate 
change into town halls and city halls and planning boards and zoning board where it’s not 
partisan: it’s just very practical” (quoted in Khan 2014: 2). This re-framing strategy is 
indirect but vital. First it counters the climate denial narrative: climate change is real and 
these are its impacts. Secondly it encourages and builds partnerships: you need to develop 
common sense strategies to deal with climate change (and we can help). These programs 
are growing in strength and number (CEQ 2014) and suggest how communities, towns, 
cities and states might act as incubators of new policies or ideas which may eventually 
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lead to a major federal shift. The next challenge is how to enact that shift – how to scale 
up sub-state initiatives to the federal or central state or, in the language of transition 
theorists, how to ensure norms and practices adopted in the niche become practiced more 
widely (Berkhout et al. 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Efforts to green the US state have been bogged down by features distinctive to the US:  
these include specific institutional pathologies, competition between entrenched interests, 
a privileging of the economy, and a limited conception of the public good. This chapter 
has identified several such barriers but has also suggested how each is cemented by 
powerful frames and a discourse dominance currently enjoyed by opponents of any green 
state action. Overcoming such barriers requires bypassing veto points but also – as 
advocated by ecological modernization proponents - re-framing climate in terms of 
economic opportunity and security. This chapter has suggested further, however, that this 
ecological modernization approach is not enough to green the state because it ignores the 
role of citizens. Re-framing climate initiatives as economy-boosting does little to assuage 
citizen concerns of an overweening state, or involve them in a transition. Efforts to green 
the American state will thus need to re-frame the state and citizens’ role within it. In the 
US, at least, it will mean ensuring green initiatives are not concentrated at central level 
but are re-located to the subnational level and citizens themselves. In short, greening 
needs to come from below. It needs to be re-framed not as a centralized green state 
endeavor but as a bottom up, citizen-inspired venture.  
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While this chapter has focused on the US and highlighted its distinctive role, the analysis 
offers wider insights into the nature of green state transformation. First, attention to 
institutional and ideological factors is clearly important; they can spur or block 
sustainability and climate initiatives. But equally important is an understanding of how 
climate, sustainability and the state are themselves understood and framed by citizens, 
interests and policymakers. Secondly, any analysis of the state’s role must include 
attention to its citizens. Ecological modernization accounts often neglect this aspect of 
green state development. The chapter has thus underlined the argument made by 
Eckersley, Paehlke, Smith and others: green measures are unlikely to be successful 
without opportunities for democratic participation. Further, this chapter has shown not 
only that participation is important, but that citizen and grassroots niche activity can 
thrive even when the central state is stymied. That suggests grassroots action might not 
only supplement, but could even trigger or spark broader initiatives. Finally while this 
chapter has made much of the US’ distinctive, if not exceptional, characteristics, every 
state is distinct and greening solutions must recognize that diversity. There is, in other 
words, no one way to green or transform the state, but rather a mix of framing strategies 
and initiatives which should reflect individual state characteristic even while seeking 
common global solutions.   
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1 New Institutionalists do not ignore discourse but it is not usually central to their analysis (see 
Schmidt 2008). 
  
2 For a recent example of seemingly implacably opposed interests clashing over environmental 
issues, see Nijhuis’ (2014) coverage of on-going debates concerning the Keystone XL pipeline 
which, if approved, would create a direct link between the Alberta oil sands and the Gulf of 
Mexico.  
 
3 Typical was John Boehner’s (House Republican leader) heated claim that the proposed climate 
change bill’s cap and trade “will increase taxes on all Americans who drive a car, who have a job, 
who turn on a light switch, pure and simple” (quoted in the Economist 7 March 2009, p48). 
 
4 Under the Clean Air Act (as interpreted by subsequent court rulings) federal executive agencies 
have the power to regulate CO2 emissions. The new rules announced by Obama administration in 
2013 and unveiled by the EPA in 2014 require all new power plants to cut carbon emissions by 
30 % by 2030.  
 
5 Frames and narratives are sometimes used interchangeably in the discourse literature.  In this 
chapter, narratives refer to the overarching idea or story being portrayed (e.g. climate denialism), 
while framing (e.g. the doubt frame) is the technique used by actors to simplify and communicate 
that wider narrative.   
 
6 The results indicate sharp partisan differences, with over 50 % of Republicans in the ’skeptic’ 
camp compared to only 15 % of Democrats.  (Gallup Organization 2014; See also Pew Research 
Center 2013).  
 
7  While this section is concerned primarily with the media as reflecting or representing public 
understanding, its role is of course interactive: the media not merely reflects but can also shape 
public perceptions.  See Boykoff and Boykoff 2004 
 
8 The precise question asked was: “Which will be the biggest threat to the country in the future: 
big business, big labor or big government”?  
 
9  The Apollo metaphor compares the task of controlling climate to the America’s successful 
1960s effort to put a man on the moon. 
 
10 Advocates promote shale as a ‘transition’ fuel: cleaner than coal and therefore a step towards a 
more sustainable energy future.  Opponents however note that coal will simply be shipped and 
burned elsewhere. They also highlight the risk during drilling operations of escaped methane, a 
greenhouse gas more potent than C02 (See Small et al. 2014).  
 
11 To illustrate, Louisiana and Texas have introduced state measures requiring educators to teach 
climate change denial as a valid scientific position (Bidwell 2014).     
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